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Many different monitoring systems have been created to identify system state conditions 
to detect or prevent a myriad of deliberate attacks, or arbitrary faults inherent in any 
complex system. Monitoring systems are also vulnerable to attack. A stealthy attacker 
can simply turn off or disable these monitoring systems without being detected; he would 
thus be able to perpetrate the very attacks that these systems were designed to stop. For 
example, many examples of virus attacks against antivirus scanners have appeared in the 
wild. In this paper, we present a novel technique to “monitor the monitors” in such a way 
that (a) unauthorized shutdowns of critical monitors are detected with high probability, 
(b) authorized shutdowns raise no alarm, and (c) the proper shutdown sequence for 
authorized shutdowns cannot be inferred from reading memory.  The techniques 
proposed to prevent unauthorized shut down (turning off) of monitoring systems was 
inspired by the duality of safety technology devised to prevent unauthorized discharge 




Much time and effort have been put into developing systems and processes that can 
monitor and protect against various types of threats.  For example: Anti-virus programs 
are designed to identify and disable all viruses that attempt to infect a computer.  
Intrusion detection systems are supposed to notify and protect against unwanted 
infiltrations into a system.   
 
A knowledgeable user or a system administrator who desires to perpetrate malicious acts 
can simply disengage a monitoring system designed to identify and detect malicious acts. 
(If the personnel responsible for securing a system are themselves insider attackers, the 
monitoring systems that send alerts to them would therefore be rendered useless even if 
not disengaged.) Hence, all monitoring systems, regardless of how well they meet their 
stated objectives, suffer from the same fatal vulnerability, they may be turned off (or 
ignored).  If a less sophisticated attacker begins his attack by initially shutting down the 
monitors, and that act provides no warning or alarm, the attacker will have free reign to 
pursue his attack unimpeded by any process. Any relatively unsophisticated subsequent 
attack can successfully cause damage.   
 
One may presume that a monitoring system designed with a “heart beat” that 
continuously informs personnel of its own state, and that it is actively at work, will 
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adequately solve the problem. In some cases this may be so. However, the clever attacker 
may possibly use a man-in-the-middle attack to ensure the signal is continuously 
broadcast, but the core monitoring functions may still be disabled. In other words, the 
techniques proposed herein may still be applicable to the core functions of the monitoring 
system whether or not it persistently signals its own state.  
 
Furthermore, there may be some circumstances in which the owner of the system may 
legitimately wish to discontinue the monitoring process without generating alarms, say 
during a system update process that causes sufficient change to system state sufficient to 
cause many alarms, or worse lock down the system. Graceful control of the monitoring 
infrastructure is clearly a desideratum.  
 
The concept proposed herein involves a uniquely formed network of monitors that are 
created anew when a system is first booted up and each time thereafter. A series of 
system boot ups creates a diversity of independent monitoring networks. No information 
persists across each instance of a monitoring network that provides any useful 
information to an attacker.  
 
The network of monitors consists of a set of monitoring programs each designed to 
logically connect two at least two other randomly chosen monitors. Each such monitor is 
required to have at least two other monitors connected to it. The key concept is that if a 
monitoring program is shut down (eg., by use of the “kill” command on Linux systems, 
or “end process” command on Windows systems), then at least one of the two monitoring 
programs will notice the killed process and issue an alarm. The implementation of this 
alarm function and protecting it from interception can be implemented by a number of 
designer choices, such as an irrevocable destruction of critical data on a disk to prevent 
the host from being used any further, alternatively a “secret back channel” can be 
employed communicating information to a number of security personnel in a manner that 
survives interception unless all security personnel collude. There may be many methods 
to implement and protect the alarm, but in this paper we are focused primarily on the 
means of detecting when an attacker, such as a knowledgeable insider, attempts to shut 
down the system monitoring function. 
 
It is thus the goal of this paper to present a protocol for dealing with this potential attack 
in a way that allows an authorized agent to turn off the system but raises an alarm during 
an unauthorized attempted shutdown.  Our goal is to provide an appropriate answer to the 
question of “Who monitors the monitors?”  
 
 
2. Attack Models and Assumptions 
 
2.1 Attack Models 
 
The ultimate goal of the attacker in all our models is to disable (by killing or otherwise 
corrupting) the critical process (CP) that we hope to protect (e.g. AV, RUU monitor). 
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Given these assumptions, we consider three increasingly sophisticated threat models: 
 
(A) An attacker cannot see inter-process traffic. 
(B) An attacker can see inter-process traffic. 
(C) An attacker can see inter-process traffic and can shut off every process on one 
computer simultaneously. 
 
Attack Model A considers an attacker with very limited capabilities and serves as a 
proof-of-concept model for the validity of the general strategy proposed below.  If the 
proposed protocols cannot identify unauthorized attacks when an attacker is so limited, 
there is no need to test against more sophisticated attack models. 
 
Attack Model B considers an attack by a slightly more sophisticated attacker.  As the 
proposed protocols are critically based upon interprocess traffic, the next most logical 
model to consider would be to relax the privacy assumptions regarding that traffic were 
relaxed.  The most basic relaxation would be to allow the attacker to identify the sender 
and receiver of any traffic, as well as when it is sent.  The proposed techniques for 
addressing Attack Model A fail under these new circumstances and extensions are 
proposed.   
 
Attack Model C represents a further extension of the previous model.  The protocols 
proposed to address Attack Model B (and A as well) rely on the idea that there must 
necessarily be a delay between shutting off a process and a second.  In this model, we 
relax this assumption and allow all monitors (or a subset thereof) to be shut down 
simultaneously.  With this capability, an attacker can overcome the techniques employed 
to counter Attack Models A and B. 
 
We did not, however, consider memory-based attacks.  The reasons for this are that we 
assume that they can be countered by specially designed hardware (TPM for bootup, IDS 
chip for ongoing monitoring) and software (polymorphic code for the monitors to make 





While this paper primarily focuses on detecting and warning against unauthorized 
attempts to shut down a critical process, we believe that the techniques detailed herein 
can be extended to apply to identifying potential attempts to corrupt the code. 
 
With regard to an attacker’s capabilities in executing an attack, we assume that an 
attacker has the ability to see all processes that are running and can kill any of them. 
 
The design of the below procedures depend upon processes being shut down in a specific 
sequence.   In an operational monitoring system, the following characteristics must be 
implemented to achieve the desired behavior: 
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1) An attacker cannot read the identity of the next monitor in the sequence by 
scanning memory.  This assumption can be practically implemented using a 
polymorphic code.  See Further Research for more details about this 
assumption. 
2) The time between monitoring pings is less than the time required by an attacker to 
shut down a second process.  If that were not the case, an attacker could exploit 
that weakness by shutting down the monitors in rapid succession and reduce the 
risk of triggering an alarm. 
 
3)  A further potential problem would arise if an attacker could kill a process and set 
up his own process in its place in the time between “monitoring pings.”  As in the 
previous concern, however, it should be possible to adjust the frequency of the 
pings such that the time needed to set up any new process would be longer than 
the time to the next ping. 
 
4) Network congestion and computational limitations can lead to false positives 
when incorporating too many hosts or monitors as “ping” response times may be 
slowed enough to be considered as non-responses. 
 
5) Any communications between two distinct hosts need to be secure and in such a 
way that the identities of the two hosts are authenticated.  This is to eliminate the 




3. Proposed Solution 
 
Our proposed solution to this problem is inspired by the safety protocol employed in 
nuclear weapon safety.  See Related Research for more details. 
 
The basic underlying framework of our proposed solutions for all three attack models is 
to create a random directed cycle of monitors at bootup using a TPM or other secure 
bootup process, wherein the randomization is based on a seed known only to users with 
the authorization to shut the system down.  In this cycle, each monitor only cares about 
the next monitor in the cycle.  However, one of the processes must disregard any actions 
done to the process it is monitoring.  The disregarded monitor is thus the first process 
(SS1) to be killed in the SS.  The second process (SS2) to be killed in the SS is the 
process that (SS1) was monitoring.  As the process monitoring it has been killed, no 
alarms will be raised when SS2 is shut down.  Similarly, the third process (SS3) to be 
killed in the SS is the process that (SS2) was watching.  Again, no alarms will be raised 
as the only monitor that cares about whether it is running, i.e. (SS2) has previously been 
killed.  The remaining order of shutdowns in the SS is constructed similarly; the last 
process (SSlast) to be shut down in sequence is process (dr).  A user that is authorized to 
shut down the critical process can recover the proper SS by following the logic of the 
bootup process. 
 


















However, if any process is killed in an order other than the SS, the monitor that is 
watching it will still be alive and will raise an alarm. 
 
If implemented correctly for each threat model, the probability of correctly guessing the 
SS comprised of n monitors is 1/(n!).  Additionally, with this construct, we realize the 
important goal that the sequence needed to shut down the monitors without raising an 
alarm is not stored in memory anywhere, but rather it is stored in the structure of the 
monitoring network itself. 
 
Using this framework, we can then apply them to the three threat models we delineated. 
 
(A) In this threat model, we assume that the attacker can not see the traffic between 
processes, i.e. the attacker does not know which process is monitoring which 
other process.  Under these assumptions, a simple directed cycle of monitoring 
would be sufficient to implement the SS.  If an attacker cannot see the cycle, then 
he must guess a random permutation of the n monitors of which there are n! 
possibilities.  Thus, for a large enough monitoring network, a simple loop can 
reasonably reliably warn against unauthorized attempts to shut down the CP. 
 
(B) However, if we assume that the attacker can see inter-process traffic, then the 
structure of the entire cycle is known to the attacker.  The only safety mechanism 
remaining is the identity of the first monitor in the SS; once SS1 is known, SS2 
and subsequent processes in the SS can be determined with probability 1.  The 
probability of guessing the correct SS would thereby increase from 1/(n!) to 1/n. 
 
Under this threat model, therefore, we propose an extension of the original 
protocol.  We still maintain an underlying directed cycle; but, in addition, we also 
require all processes to monitor all other processes.  Unlike the monitoring 
between consecutive processes in the SS, monitors will not raise alarms if a 
process other than the next one in the SS is killed.  Effectively, each process 
Monitor1 Monitor2 Monitor3 Monitor4 Monitor5
Critical 
Process
SS1 SS2 SS3 SS4 SS5 / 
SSlast
disregard
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With this extension, the attacker’s ability to view inter-process traffic provides no 
additional information as to the correct SS.  Each monitor looks identical: it sends 
and receives information from every other monitor.  Furthermore, as long as a 
monitor receives “pings” from the monitor it is watching, it reacts to receiving a 
ping from any monitor in an identical way.  It is only when the next process in the 
SS is shut down that the monitor behaves differently, but by then, an alarm is 
raised and the attacker cannot glean any information about the sequence.  The 
graph of processes and monitors effectively is complete and the true SS is 
therefore obfuscated by meaningless, yet symmetric, inter-process traffic.  A 
correct identification of SS1 will therefore provide no information regarding the 
identity of SS2; the probability of guessing the correct SS therefore returns to 
1/(n!). 
 
(C) As in threat model (B), we assume the attacker can see inter-process traffic.  Thus 
for this model, on any given computer, we should use the protocol established in 
(B) such that the probability of a correct guess remains 1/(n!).  However, with the 
additional assumption that the attacker can gain control of the computer (via a 
root-kit, or some other means) and the ability to shut off all monitors at once, the 
attacker can disable the CP without the requirement of figuring out the SS.   
 
To counter this additional threat, the protocol must be extended to share the 
monitoring load across multiple remote hosts.  In addition to the network of 
monitors on each computer, a “communicating process” should be created and 
attached to the created to the critical process to broadcast the “alarm” status on 
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Two types of unauthorized shutdowns must be monitored within this larger 
system: 1) a monitoring process is shut down out of order of that host’s SS and 2) 
a “communicating process” is shut down.  In the event that a type (1) shutdown 
occurs, the communicating process should broadcast to all hosts in the network 
that an alarm has been raised in its system.  In the event of a type (2) shutdown, 
the communicating process on each other host must realize that it can no longer 


















Using this protocol, an improper shutdown sequence on any individual machine 
will raise an alarm on all connected remote hosts.  Thus even if an attacker 
manages to gain control of one host and shuts off all its monitors and CP, other 
hosts in the network can identify that there is a potential unauthorized shutdown 
on that host and react accordingly.  With a large number of computers, the 
probability of simultaneously shutting off the monitors on all hosts is reasonably 
remote. 
 
Summary of Models 
 
Attack Model Attacker Capabilities Proposed Solution 
A Cannot see interprocess 
traffic 
Simple cycle of monitors 
B Can see interprocess traffic Complete graph of monitors 
C Can see interprocess traffic 
and can shut off multiple 
processes simultaneously 
Complete graph of monitors 
and remote monitoring 
Memory (not considered) Can read memory to 
determine next in sequence 
Polymorphic code, specially 
designed IDS hardware 
Bootup (not considered) Can learn information about 









Host 1 Host 2





















4. Alternative Protocols 
 
There are two alternative protocols that could be implemented to achieve similar results.  
However, each of them has their own advantages and disadvantages. 
 
The first alternative is a different approach to the protocol presented to address attack 
model (C).  As opposed to a system in which each computer can have its own unique SS 
and interacts with other computers via a communicating process, a distributed system, in 
which one SS applies to all computers, could be employed.   
 
In this system, the seed for the random cycle on the first computer is passed to all others 
in the network.  Each computer then creates a similar network of processes on its 
machine.  Once these networks are set up, monitoring processes communicate across 
hosts such that all processes “ping” all other processes, but the SS1 of each only cares 
about the SS2 of each and so on.  In order to shut down the system without alarms, every 
SS1 process in the network must initially be shut off followed by every SS2, and so on 
until all monitors are turned off.   
 
The main advantage to this protocol is the fact that it will be much more sensitive to any 
attempts to shut off processes on any of the linked hosts.  However, the drawbacks for 
this plan are numerous and outweigh any gain.  Firstly, the amount of additional network 
traffic generated over the proposed protocol is greater by orders of magnitude.  Secondly, 
the necessity for passing the seed for the random cycle to a remote host introduces yet 
another possible point of vulnerability for the system.  Lastly, the enmeshed nature of this 
network makes it that much harder to extricate one host from the network, even if done 
so with proper authorization. 
 
The second alternative represents a paradigm shift in terms of approaching a solution.   
 
The idea for this protocol is again to create a directed cycle of monitoring processes (not 
necessarily random); however, the processes need not be shut down in any specific order.  
Processes continuously run and monitor the next in the sequence; yet if a process or host 
wishes to exit the network (“leaving process”), it must inform the process that is 
monitoring it that it wishes to leave the network by passing it a special code.  The 
“leaving process” then securely passes along the information concerning the process it is 
monitoring to the process that is monitoring it.  In this way, even though a process has 
left, a cycle of monitoring processes and the protection it provides are preserved. 
 
The advantages to this protocol lie in the reduction in the inter-process and inter-host 
traffic as well as provide a method by which monitors can leave the network with proper 
authorization.  On the other hand, the disadvantages include the computational overhead 
necessary for secure communication between processes and the fact that the validation 
code for “leave requests” must be stored in memory (where it may be subject to attack). 






5. Related Research 
 
Interestingly, the concept is similar in nature to nuclear weapon safety systems. It is 
natural that dangerous weapons be prevented from accidental discharge, hence safety 
mechanisms have been developed to prevent unwanted discharge unless and until a 
specific unique code is provided to the weapon. Whereas one desires to prevent the 
unauthorized or accidental discharge (turning on) of a nuclear weapon, hence requiring a 
safety mechanism, this paper proposes a system to prevent the unauthorized or accidental 
disengagement (turning off) of a monitoring system, hence requiring a means of 
generating an alarm whenever  an illegitimate attempt is made to render a monitoring 
system inactive. 
 
Nuclear weapons are carried by planes, mounted on rockets, and are generally deployed 
with little fear of accidental arming and detonation.  In order to detonate a nuclear device, 
energy must reach the critical components of the bomb.  Safety protocol thus requires 
that an energy barrier must surround these components, thereby isolating the components 
from any significant amount of energy.  Energy gateways, known as stronglinks, are 
embedded within this energy barrier.  A stronglink serves as a physical gateway in the 
barrier for energy to pass through to the inner critical components. At rest, the stronglink 
is as impenetrable to energy as the rest of the barrier.  However, upon receiving a correct 
unique signal (UQS), the stronglink effectively opens up and allows energy to pass into 
the interior of the barrier.  The stronglink and its UQS are constructed such that only an 
“unambiguous communication of intent” will allow the bomb to detonate.  The stronglink 
contains a “UQS discriminator” that evaluates each sequence event in succession and 
responds accordingly, i.e. allowing the next event to be processed in the event of a correct 
UQS event and permanently sealing the barrier in the event of an incorrect UQS event.  
The UQS is designed such that the probabilities of a random electrical (or other medium 
of transmission) signal occurring under abnormal circumstances or unauthenticated 
agents generating the correct sequence are very low.  All these safety mechanisms 
combined provide a very high degree of safety for nuclear weapons. 
 
It is this interaction between the UQS and stronglink in nuclear devices that inspired a 
solution to our problem.  While it was clear that a cycle of mutually checking monitors 
should prevent attempted shutdowns from going unrecognized, it remained to be seen 
how such a scheme could be implemented without storing any shutdown key information 
in memory.  It is here that the stronglink and UQS system provided the key insight.  
Whereas the goal in nuclear safety protocols is to refuse to arm the device if even one 
UQS event is incorrect, our task presents the dual problem, i.e. to raise an alarm if even 
one step in the shutdown sequence (SS) is incorrect and to allow the user to proceed with 
shutting down the next process unhindered if the sequence is correct.  Effectively, the key 
would be implied and validated by the very structure of the monitoring network. 
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[2] describes methods for limiting the types of randomization to avoid sequences that can 
be commonly entered either by accidental or by guess.  Given that the main focus of 
these restriction were to preclude typical signals emitted by electrical discharges caused 
by damage or failure, these methods need not be applied to the protocol. 
 
In addition, [2] describes procedures for keeping the UQS generator and stronglink 
separate until there is an intent to “detonate”.  This prevents any unauthorized actions 
form occurring, malicious or not. This concept should be applied to the proposed 
protocols to provide a further measure of protection against unauthorized shutdowns.  If 
the correct sequence were stored on a remote host or in some segregated and protected 
section of memory, the monitoring system’s sequence would remain unknown should an 
attacker fail to additionally gain access to the remote host or area of memory. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Further Research 
 
Ultimately, we believe that the general techniques presented herein can serve as the basis 
for more secure monitoring systems.  However, further research is required to convert 
this protocol into a scalable and reliable product. 
 
The first necessary area of further exploration relates to the use of a TPM chip in such a 
way as to ensure that the monitoring processes are loaded in an uncorrupt state. 
 
While we have implemented a software-based version of a system incorporating these 
protocols, an ideal system would be implemented as close to the hardware layer as 
possible.  Specially designed hardware components gain even more importance when 
the “threat model” is expanded to include an attacker’s ability to introduce corrupt 
code to the monitoring processes.  By incorporating hardware into the system, a designer 
can reduce the likelihood of a successful attack as an attacker would be required to 
physically alter the machines in order to disable the system. 
 
In addition to hardware components, the proposed monitoring system can be further 
protected by incorporating polymorphic code into its design.  Implemented correctly, the 
bootup process can then be designed such that each monitor in the network is unique; 
thus if an attacker can comprise or disable a monitor by reading its memory, s/he cannot 
leverage that information to read the memory of others. The monitoring system therefore 
becomes that much harder to disable.   
 
Another area of further research surrounds multicast protocols for sending out status 
messages between the communicating processes in each computer.  With a large number 
of computers in a mutually protecting monitoring system, the amount of inter-computer 
traffic generated with a fully-connected graph of one-to-one connections can become 
onerous for the network.  Sending messages to a router’s multicast address with an 
appropriately designed LSA protocol should simplify the delivery mechanisms 
significantly and make for a more practical system. 
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